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DIRECTORS' DUTIES IN A POST-ENRON WORLD: WHY
LANGUAGE MATTERS
Margaret M. Blair*
This essay observes that, in the face of corporate scandals of the
last few years, a number of prominent advocates for
shareholder primacy have retreated to the position that
directors and officers should attempt to maximize long-run
share value performance, rather than short-term value. But the
mantra of share value maximization has no distinctive
meaning and policy implications if it is not interpreted to mean
maximization of short-term value. This is because the actions
required to maximize share value in the long run are
indistinguishable in practice from actions taken in pursuit of
other more broadly-stated goals such as the maximization of
wealth for all corporate stakeholders. Moreover, once advocates
of shareholder primacy accept the goal of long run share value
maximization, then they should consider discarding the
language of shareholder primacy, and the associated emphasis
on high-powered, equity-based incentive systems. Such
language is unnecessarily divisive and provocative. It draws
attention to conflicting interests in corporate enterprises and
announces that, when faced with conflicts, directors should
choose actions that benefit shareholders even if those actions
harm other stakeholders. In so doing, it tends to reduce
cooperation, send signals that other participants and other
values are of secondary importance, and undermine the ethical
climate inside corporations. This essay proposes that, by
contrast, the language of "team production" supports
cooperative behavior, sharing of burdens and rewards, and
win-win solutions.
*. Visiting Associate Professor, Sloan Visiting Professor, Research
Director for the Georgetown Sloan Project on Business Institutions, Georgetown
University Law Center. I would like to thank the Georgetown - Sloan Project
for financial support while I was writing this article, and participants in the
Wake Forest Law Review Conference on The Changing Role of Directors, April
4, 2003, for helpful feedback. I would also like to thank Katherine Goyer who
provided valuable research assistance. All remaining errors of fact or logic are
my own.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What corporate governance ground rules are most likely to
foster wealth creation by the corporate sector and economic growth
more generally? For more than twenty years, a rhetorical and legal
battle over this question has been waged among corporate
managers, investors, shareholder rights advocates, and legal
academics, both in the United States and abroad. Although the
debate harkens back to a much older and more fundamental
question about the nature and purpose of the corporation,' in the
last two decades, the debate has focused, for the most part, on two
questions. The first looks only at United States corporate law and
asks how much discretion directors and officers of publicly-traded
corporations should have to consider interests other than those of
shareholders in general, especially in responding to hostile tender
offers;2 the other engages a much more complex and multi-layered
question about the kinds of governance rules that should be adopted
by emerging market and transition economy countries eager to gain
the benefits of capitalism. This essay will focus mainly on the
rhetoric used to discuss directors' duties in regard to the former
question, but the discussion has broad implications for the lessons
that United States policy specialists deliver about corporate
governance around the world.
It is no exaggeration to say that, in respect to both of these
questions, the dominant paradigm among United States legal
scholars for the last twenty years has been "shareholder primacy"-
the view that corporations should be run for the sole benefit of
shareholders, that directors and officers of a corporation are, in fact,
1. One famous round of this long-term debate took place in the 1930s
between Professors Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd. See A.A. Berle, Jr.,
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick
Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145
(1932).
2. Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1037, 1037-39 (2002) (providing a chronology of the main arguments of what he
calls the "pro-takeover, anti-board-of-directors arguments" in that debate).
Lipton, who argued early on that
directors should be governed by the business judgment rule [in
responding to hostile tender offers] and that in exercising their
judgment they should be able to take into account the interests of
employees, communities, and other constituents as well as the long-
term (and not just the short-term) interests of the shareholders,
id. at 1040, invented what he called a "Warrant Dividend Plan" in 1982 as a
tool for directors and managers to resist takeovers if they so chose. Id. at 1044.
Lipton's plan and others like it were soon nicknamed the "poison pill" by
investment bankers who were backing hostile bids. Id.
[Vol. 38
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the "agents" of the corporation's shareholders, and that, as such,
their duties are to maximize share value.3 It follows from this
perspective, according to advocates, that directors and officers
should be constrained from taking any actions that are clearly not in
the immediate best interests of shareholders.' With respect to
takeovers, for example, advocates of this perspective argue that
directors' ability to resist a hostile takeover that offers shareholders
an immediate higher price should be tightly constrained.' According
3. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253-54 & nn.15-16 (1999) (reviewing
extensive literature asserting or assuming that directors should serve
shareholders exclusively).
4. Despite the prominence of shareholder primacy rhetoric in legal and
popular literature, however, state legislatures and courts that interpret
corporate law have failed to adopt a strict shareholder primacy approach, and
have continued to protect managers and directors who make decisions that
benefit other corporate constituencies even at the apparent cost to shareholders.
See discussion infra Part III.
5. See RONALD J. GILSON, UNOCAL FIFTEEN YEARS LATER (AND WHAT WE
CAN Do ABOUT IT) (Colum. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 177, 2000) (arguing
that shareholder bylaws can restore to shareholders decision making power
with respect to tender offers that had been denied them by poison pills); Lucian
Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and
Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 113 (2001) (proposing that
shareholders should be entitled to opt into a body of federal takeover law that
would require the board to remove a pill if a majority of outstanding shares vote
in favor of a takeover bid); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1028, 1050 (1982) (arguing that
directors should not be allowed to frustrate takeover bids but should advise
shareholders as to fairness and seek competing bids) [hereinafter Bebchuk,
Case for Facilitating]; John C. Coates, IV, & Bradley C. Faris, Second-
Generation Shareholder Bylaws: Post-Quickturn Alternatives, 56 Bus. LAW
1323, 1325-27 (2001) (arguing that even shareholder bylaws cannot effectively
eliminate the takeover-chilling effect of poison pills); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1981) (arguing that the decision
about whether to accept a tender offer should rest with the shareholders alone,
and that directors should be required to be passive in the face of a takeover bid);
Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 865-75 (1981) (arguing
that management should not be able to block takeover bids, but should act to
provide information to shareholders); Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?"
Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for
Warren Buffett, 19 CARDozO L. REV. 511, 511 (1997) (arguing that shareholders
should be able to adopt a bylaw that would allow them to control the use of
poison pills in takeover battles); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for
Empowering Shareholders, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=387940 (last modified April 2003) (arguing that shareholders
should have the right not only to vote for or against any merger or acquisition
20031 887
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to some of the more adamant shareholder primacy advocates,
directors should also be constrained from paying out corporate funds
for charitable or social causes that are not directly connected to
shareholder wealth,6 and should be heavily incentivized to focus on
share value with compensation packages tied to stock price
performance.7
Academic and policy advisors from the United States, along
with financial institutions interested in investing abroad, have
carried this message to developed and developing countries as well.8
Emboldened by the outstanding performance of the United States
economy and stock market in the 1990s relative to European and
Asian economies, they frequently preached to other countries that
the shareholder-oriented model of corporate governance was the
only one that could deliver sustained economic performance.9
plan, but to initiate the sale of the firm or its assets).
6. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the
Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual
Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1199-1202 (1999) (using a
contractarian analysis to link the question of how much discretion directors
should have to use corporate resources for philanthropy to the takeover debate
by arguing that directors and officers will be constrained from straying too far
from share value maximization by the threat of takeover in the "market for
corporate control"); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporate Conduct that Does Not
Maximize Shareholder Gain: Legal Conduct, Ethical Conduct, the Penumbra
Effect, Reciprocity, the Prisoner's Dilemma, Sheep's Clothing, Social Conduct,
and Disclosure, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1, 1 (1998) (considering the "problem of
corporate philanthropy"); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial
Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579,
581 (1997) (also discussing the "problem of corporate philanthropy").
7. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the
Management-Captured Board-The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50
SMU L. REV. 127, 130-31 (1996); Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care,
Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 651-52 (1995);
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You
Pay, But How, HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at 138.
8. Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control
of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1233, 1234 (2002) (noting that "an interlocking set of institutions that
constitute 'shareholder capitalism,' American style, 2001" has been
"aggressively promot[ed] throughout the world" by United States advisors and
corporate law scholars).
9. See, e.g., THE BUSINESS SECTOR ADVISORY GROUP ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE OF THE OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: IMPROVING
COMPETITIVENESS AND ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN GLOBAL MARKETS (1998) (arguing
that "most industrial societies" recognize that the "generation of long-term
economic profit to enhance shareholder value" is the corporation's primary
objective). The Business Sector Advisory Group was led by New York corporate
lawyer Ira Millstein of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, who frequently represents and
advises institutional investors in corporate governance disputes. See also
[Vol. 38
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But the collapse of the United States stock market, the flurry of
accounting and insider trading scandals, and the surge in corporate
bankruptcies of the past two years have pulled the rhetorical rug out
from under shareholder primacy advocates. At Enron, WorldCom,
Tyco, ImClone, and too many other companies, highly-incentivized
executives who embraced shareholder primacy rhetoric looted their
companies and lied about corporate profits and assets to keep the
stock price up long enough for them to sell their shares. In the face
of such abuses, the Anglo-American insistence that share value is
the only right way to measure corporate performance and the only
acceptable goal for corporate executives and directors, rings
suddenly, pathetically, hollow. The goal of maximizing share value
(to the exclusion of other corporate goals), it now seems obvious, is
subject to gross manipulation for the benefit of insiders.
Additionally, the current scrambling of legislators, regulators, and
business people to clean up the mess and restore investor confidence
in equity investments makes it clear that the debate about corporate
governance is not over, and we have not yet seen the "End of
History" for corporate law. 10
Although few shareholder primacy advocates have conceded
that the lessons of the last few years include the idea that corporate
officers and directors must stop paying so much attention to share
prices and focus instead on other measures of corporate
performance, this paper suggests that this is exactly what should
happen. I argue that officers and directors of corporations should, in
fact, try to ignore short-term share value in most cases, and focus
instead on the business of the corporation: developing sound
corporate strategies; setting challenging but realistic goals for
operating performance; making sure that the company invests in
people, brands, ideas, and reputation; and, importantly, builds a
corporate culture that supports integrity and fair play, as well as
excellence in producing and delivering the company's product to its
markets. I further suggest rethinking the language used in
discussions of directors' duties. In attempting to build the business
and improve the long-run performance of the company, the language
and incentive structures of shareholder primacy have been
distracting at best, and, at worst, unnecessarily divisive and,
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEo. L.J. 439, 443, 449 (2001) (claiming that a consensus had been reached
around the world on the shareholder-oriented model due to "the failure of
alternative models" of the corporation, and asserting that, "[t]he triumph of the
share-holder oriented model of the corporation over its principal competitors is
now assured" and its success represents, "The End of History for Corporate
Law").
10. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 439.
20031 889
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perhaps, even conducive of unethical behavior. A language that is
more holistic, more evocative of cooperation and of win-win solutions
is now called for.
In Section II, I observe that the fall-back position of staunch
shareholder primacy advocates in the face of the corporate disasters
of the last few years is that corporate officers and directors should
work to maximize share value in the long term, rather than in the
short term." Yet, the mantra of share value maximization has no
distinctive meaning and policy implications if it is not interpreted to
mean maximization of short-term value. The actions required to
maximize share value in the long run are probably indistinguishable
in practice from more broadly stated goals, such as the
maximization of wealth for all corporate stakeholders.
In Section III, I briefly review an alternative model of corporate
governance which starts from the premise that the purpose of the
corporate form of organization is to solve the problem of contracting
among multiple parties involved in "team production."12 Under the
team production approach to corporate law, directors are understood
to be fiduciaries for the corporate entity, responsible for making the
decisions necessary to keep the corporate team productive. As
Professor Lynn Stout and I have argued elsewhere, many features of
corporate law in the United States are more consistent with our
team production model than they are with shareholder primacy, at
least if shareholder primacy is interpreted to mean maximization of
shareholder value in the short term. 13  The prescriptions for
directors' duties under the team production model, however, turn
out to be very similar, and perhaps even "observationally
11. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory,
and the Corporate Objective Function, BANK OF AM. J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall
2001, at 8, 9 (arguing that the proper goal of corporate officers and directors
should be maximization of long-term share value); see also discussion infra pp.
109-15. Among leaders in the business community, the idea that the proper
goal of corporations should be measured in the long term, and not in terms of
daily share price, or even quarterly earnings, is not controversial. See, e.g., THE
CONFERENCE BOARD COMMISSION INC., COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 15 (2003), available at http://www.conference-
board.org/knowledge/governcommission.cfm (last visited July 13, 2003) ("A view
toward the long term serves the best interests not only of the company's
shareowners, but also of the company's other constituencies, such as employees,
customers, suppliers and communities.") [hereinafter THE CONFERENCE BOARD
COMMISSION].
12. This section relies heavily on work done jointly with Professor Lynn
Stout. In particular, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
13. Id. at 250.
[Vol. 38
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equivalent," 4 in practice to the prescriptions that advocates of long-
term share value maximization would make. The difference is
primarily in the language used to describe the duties.
In Section IV, then, I argue that the language of shareholder
primacy is unnecessarily divisive and provocative, especially if what
its advocates really mean is maximization of long-term shareholder
value. As most advocates of shareholder primacy are at pains to
point out, long-term share value maximization requires that the
interests of all other corporate constituencies be accommodated.
But I argue that the language of shareholder primacy-by implying
that only one set of corporate constituents matters-is more likely to
evoke uncooperative, and even unethical behavior in the workplace
than is the language of team production. I base this argument on
evidence from empirical studies of the choices people make in "social
dilemma" games, 5 as well as studies of factors that contribute-or
detract from---establishing ethical norms and an ethical corporate
climate.16
The final section expresses a cautionary note about how the
language we use to describe the duties of corporate actors can have
unintended consequences. Just as the language of share value
maximization helped create a business climate which culminated in
the abuses of the last few years, the language of team production
can also lead to abuses. Both approaches to describing directors'
duties rely, ultimately, on the individuals in the boardroom being
people of strength and impeccable character who are knowledgeable
about and engaged in the process of governing corporations to
prevent abuses and to call forth the highest and best performance of
all corporate team members.
II. THE SHORT RUN VS. THE LONG RUN
In response to the scandals of the last few years, some
shareholder primacy advocates have retreated to an older argument,
made frequently prior to the takeover battles of the 1980s, that the
14. To an econometrician, two theories or explanations of patterns in data
are "observationally equivalent" if they both predict the same pattern or set of
relationships in the data.
15. This evidence is reviewed in detail in Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001).
16. See, eg., Lynn L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of
Corporations and Their Directors and Officers for Corporate Climate: The
Psychology of Enron's Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming Fall 2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=350341 (last visited July 10, 2003)
(providing an excellent summary of the role of corporate climate in fostering
ethical behavior).
2003]
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proper goal of corporate managers and directors is the maximization
of profit, or share value, in the long run.7 The idea that there is a
distinction between factors that might cause share prices to rise or
fall in the short run and those that drive the long-run performance
of share prices was, for many twentieth-century decades, the device
that allowed courts and legislatures to sanction activities by
corporations that were intended to benefit stakeholders other than
shareholders without explicitly adopting a model of the corporation
as a social entity with responsibilities to many stakeholders. Courts
protected directors at companies that rejected a hostile takeover in
part to protect employees, 18 that avoided risky undertakings that
would benefit shareholders at creditors' expense, 9 that rejected
profitable business opportunities that might be damaging to a local
community," or that gave money to charitable causes." "The law
17. Harvard's Michael Jensen, one of the most prominent and adamant
advocates of shareholder primacy, an unfettered market for corporate control,
and compensation tied to stock price performance, has lately conceded, for
example, that a myopic focus on short-term share value can be harmful. Jensen
has observed that "an overvalued stock can be as damaging to a company as an
undervalued stock." Joseph Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Just Say No to Wall
Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter
2002, at 41. Jensen now argues that the criterion managers should use in
making decisions is "maximization of the long-run value of the firm." Jensen,
supra note 11, at 9. Moreover, Jensen's notion of "firm value," is defined to
mean "not just the value of the equity, but the sum of the values of all financial
claims on the firm-debt, warrants, and preferred stock, as well as equity." Id.
at 8. Jensen refers to this broader notion of value maximization as "enlightened
value maximization." Id. at 9; see also Eric Talley, On the Demise of
Shareholder Primacy (Or, Murder on the James Trains Express), 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1211, 1214 (2002) (dismissing attacks on the correctness of share value
maximization as the primary corporate goal as "becoming a straw person among
academics," and suggesting that all of the best minds in law and economics
have abandoned any commitment to short-term share value maximization).
18. See, e.g., Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 556-57 (Del. 1964).
19. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe
Communications Corp., No. CIv.A. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *107-09
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
20. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780-81 (Ill. App. Ct.
1968).
21. The Delaware courts made clear in Theodora Holding Corp. v.
Henderson, that in its view, the loss of shareholders' profits from reasonable
contributions to charities "is far out-weighed by the overall benefits flowing
from the placing of such gift in channels where it serves to benefit those in need
of philanthropic or educational support." 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969). By
the late 1970s, forty-eight states had passed laws "explicitly providing that
chartered corporations could give to charities without specific charter
provision[s]." EDWARD S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 401
n.40 (1981).
892 [Vol. 38
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'papered over' the conflict in our conception of the corporation by
invoking a murky distinction between long-term profit maximization
and short-term profit maximization," wrote William T. Allen, former
Chancellor of the Delaware Court, in explaining why the law
permitted such activities while still using the language of what he
called the "stock-holders oriented property theory" of the
corporation.2
The problem with trying to make this distinction in the 1980s
and 1990s, however, was that it represented a rejection of the
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis ("ECMH"), one of the central
tenets of finance theory.23 According to the ECMH, the prices of
securities that trade in active and liquid markets should, at all
times, reflect "an unbiased forecast of future cash flows that fully
reflects all publicly available information."24  Today's price,
according to finance theory, collapses the value of the expected
future stream of dividend payments on the security into a single
"present value." Thus, one of the supposed benefits of using share
prices as the lodestar of performance for corporate officers and
directors is that share prices are believed to be a forward-looking
measure-the market's best guess about the value of investments
undertaken so far as well as investments to be made in the future-
while all accounting measures of performance are backward looking.
Not only are share prices forward looking, according to the ECMH,
but they are also the best crystal ball we have for evaluating the
impact that decisions made today will have on corporate
performance in the future.
Thus, the importance of the belief in short-term share price
performance as the best measure of corporate performance, and
hence, of the performance of directors and officers of the company,
cannot be overstated. In the heat of the takeover wars of the 1980s
and early 1990s, it was the fact that takeovers offered shareholders
of target firms an immediate gain in the value of their shares that,
to share value maximization and takeover advocates, required
officers and directors to remain passive and not resist the takeover.
Takeover advocates believed that allowing takeovers to go forward
was necessary to maximize the total wealth created in the corporate
22. See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business
Corporation, 14 CARDOzO L. REV. 261, 272-73 (1992).
23. See Gordon, supra note 8, at 1235, 1241 (noting that the Enron episode
"provides another set of reasons to question the strength of the efficient market
hypothesis" which, he adds, "has been one of the underpinnings of the argument
for shareholder choice in the decision whether to accept a hostile takeover bid at
a premium to the market price").
24. RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 136 (1993).
20031
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sector because widespread evidence showed that target company
share prices rose on the announcement of a bid for the shares.25
Also, according to the ECMH, the rise in share prices of target
company shares necessarily implied that takeovers were good for
the economy overall. The fact that stock prices overall rose during
the takeover era was taken as evidence of this claim.26
If one lesson of Enron and other corporate disasters in the last
few years is that today's share price cannot be counted on to reflect
the true underlying value of the equity of a corporation, then the
rise in share prices in the short run after the announcement of a
hostile tender offer cannot necessarily be interpreted as reflecting a
true increase in value that would result from the takeover.2 ' And if
the rise in share prices is not uncontestable evidence that value will
be created by a proposed takeover, then this undercuts a key
contention of takeover advocates who had argued that the "market
for corporate control" provides sufficient discipline to be sure that
corporate officers and directors use their authority over corporate
resources in ways that tend to maximize value creation by
corporations.
Despite the critical importance of the belief that share prices at
any point in time are the best estimate of the true underlying value
of the stock, we find that, in the aftermath of the recent corporate
scandals, formerly die-hard shareholder primacy advocates are now
conceding that share prices can be manipulated in the short run.
Harvard's Michael Jensen, a leading standard bearer for
shareholder primacy, now says that corporate directors and officers
25. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for
Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983)
(summarizing evidence from "event studies" that target company share prices
rise on the announcement of a tender offer, and arguing that this is evidence of
social gains from takeovers).
26. See Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the
Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 837 (1993) (noting that from
1976 to 1990, total merger and acquisition transactions generated $750 billion
in gains to target company shareholders (measured in 1992 dollars)).
27. Professor Lynn Stout challenged the notion that the premium offered
for the shares of takeover targets should be interpreted as evidence of the
additional value that would be created by the acquisition of the target bidder.
See Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price,
Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 Yale L.J. 1235, 1259-75 (1990); see also
SARA B. MOELLER ET AL., Do SHAREHOLDERS OF ACQUIRING FIRMS GAIN FROM
ACQUISITIONS? (Dice Center, Working Paper No. 2003-4), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract id=383560 (2003) (last modified Feb.
2003) (noting that in 12,023 acquisitions by public firms from 1980 to 2001,
acquiring firms lost a total of $218 billion when the acquisitions were
announced).
894 [Vol. 38
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should "Just Say No to Wall Street" pressure for short-term
earnings performance, at least if it requires so-called "earnings
guidance" to live up to Wall Street's expectations. 8 Instead, he
advises corporate directors and officers to practice what he calls
"enlightened value maximization," instead of focusing too narrowly
on short-run share prices.29 "Enlightened value maximization," he
says, requires maximizing the aggregate value of all financial
securities (debt plus equity) issued by the firm, not just maximizing
the value of equity shares.3"
It is instructive, however, to see what Jensen says directors and
officers must do to maximize financial value: "In order to maximize
value, corporate managers must not only satisfy, but enlist the
support of, all corporate stakeholders-customers, employees,
managers, suppliers, and local communities. Top management
plays a critical role in this function through its leadership and
effectiveness in creating, projecting, and sustaining the company's
strategic vision."3' "Enlightened value maximization," he continues,
"uses much of the structure of stakeholder theory but accepts
maximization of the long-run value of the firm as the criterion for
making the requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders. '' 2
Thus, it turns out that as shareholder primacy advocates have
become "enlightened," they have discovered that value creation
involves vision, risk-taking, and complex trade-offs among a variety
of different participants in the business enterprise of the firm. The
implicit prescription for director behavior under a rule of
enlightened value maximization is not very well specified, however.
As long as directors are not rapaciously self-interested or grossly
negligent, it is difficult to see how a court could use an "enlightened
value maximization" standard to determine whether directors are
carrying out their fiduciary duties.
III. THE "TEAM PRODUCTION" ALTERNATIVE
In earlier work I have done jointly with Professor Lynn Stout,
we have argued that corporate law should be understood as an
important solution to the problem of organizing production in
teams.33 We use the phrase "team production" to refer to productive
28. Fuller & Jensen, supra note 17, at 41.
29. Jensen, supra note 11, at 9.
30. Id. at 8.
31. Id. at 9.
32. Id.
33. Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 250. Corporate law is not the only
solution to this problem, to be sure, but one more likely to be used the larger the
number of individual contributors to the corporate team, and the more complex
and enterprise specific the contributions must be.
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activity that requires multiple parties to make contributions that
are complex, at least somewhat specific to the enterprise the team is
undertaking, difficult to verify, and non-separable, meaning that it
is impossible to determine ex post which team member is
responsible for what part of the output.34  Economists who have
studied the problem of team production have observed that it is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to write complete contracts
that would govern the relationships among team members. 5
Building on that prior body of work, Professor Stout and I
constructed a theoretical solution to the team production problem
which works by allocating control rights to certain parties who are
not members of the team. In particular, we suggest that corporate
law provides one possible solution by offering a legal structure in
which all of the assets used in production by the team, as well as the
output from the efforts of the team, are the property of a separate
legal entity, the corporation, and decision rights over these assets
are relegated to a board of directors that is independent of the
team.36 Directors, then, have fiduciary duties that run to the
corporation-the legal entity that represents the aggregate interests
of all of the "team members"-and'only through the corporation to
shareholders.3 7
Professor Stout and I further argue that many features of
corporate law in the United States are more consistent with our
team production model than they are with shareholder primacy.38
For example, although it has become common in legal scholarship in
34. Id. at 249-50.
35. Id. at 265-71 (reviewing theoretical literature about the difficulty of
solving the team production problem, especially work by economists Armen
Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Bengt Holmstrom, Oliver Hart, Raghurum Rajan
and Luigi Zingales); see, e.g., Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
777, 779-83 (1972) (defining team production problems); Oliver D. Hart,
Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 121-
25 (1988) (noting that property rights, which give the "owner" residual control
rights, help to close the gaps in incomplete contracts); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral
Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 325 (1982) (noting the impossibility of
writing complete contracts governing the relationships among team members
who make team-specific investment without introducing distorting incentives);
Raghurum G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in the Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 387 (1998) (noting that one solution to the team production problem
requires team members to yield certain control rights to someone outside the
team).
36. Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 271-79.
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C cmt. a (1958) (stating that
directors' duties are owed to "the corporation itself rather than to the
shareholder individually or collectively").
38. Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 249-50.
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the last two decades to refer to corporate directors and managers as
"agents" of shareholders, 9 corporate law in fact makes a sharp
distinction between the role of managers and the role of directors.
Dean Robert Clark makes this point succinctly:
(1) corporate officers like the president and treasurer are
agents of the corporation itself; (2) the board of directors is the
ultimate decision-making body of the corporation (and in a
sense is the group most appropriately identified with "the
corporation"); (3) directors are not agents of the corporation
but are sui generis; (4) neither officers nor directors are agents
of the stockholders; but (5) both officers and directors are
"fiduciaries" with respect to the corporation and its
stockholders .40
As noted above,41 corporate law also provides enormous
discretion to directors who make decisions in good faith about the
allocation of corporate resources, even in cases where it is hard to
show how such allocations benefit shareholders. Courts have also
explicitly recognized that in situations in which share value is not a
good proxy for the overall wealth creating capacity of the
corporation, directors' duties may run to other stakeholders,
especially creditors.42
Furthermore, the rules of derivative actions are much more
consistent with a team production interpretation of corporate law
than with a shareholder primacy interpretation. Although
ordinarily only common shareholders have standing to file a
derivative action,43 several procedural hurdles make it difficult for
39. An example of the persistent reliance on this construct can be found in
Lucian A. Bebchuck's work. See Bebchuck, Case for Facilitating, supra note 5.
Bebchuck uses the words "management," "boards," "directors," and "boards of
directors" completely interchangeably throughout the article, which is devoted
in its entirety to examining proposed solutions to the "principal-agent" problem
between shareholders and management/directors.
40. Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESs 55, 56 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985) (emphasis added).
41. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108
(noting that when a corporation is "in the vicinity of insolvency" director duties
run to "the community of interests" that make up the corporation).
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 327 (2002). The court in
Hoff v. Sprayregan also granted standing to file a derivative action to
convertible debenture holders who had converted their holdings into common
stock during the time in which the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty had
occurred, but this approach has not been widely followed. 52 F.R.D. 243, 247-48
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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shareholders to take such action.44 Moreover, if, despite the
obstacles, the derivative action is successful, any damages recovered
must be paid not to the shareholders who pursued the action, but to
the corporation. Finally, shareholders can only win a derivative
action if directors are found to have blatantly violated their duty of
loyalty by appropriating to themselves resources that belong to the
corporation, or have so negligently violated their duty of care that
their actions were judged to have wasted corporate resources. In
these situations, the harm done is to the interests of the corporation
as a whole, rather than directly to the suing shareholders, or even to
shareholders as a group. Meanwhile, shareholder actions have not
been successful where they allege that directors have made
decisions or allocated resources in ways that may benefit other
corporate stakeholders, even at the (short-run) expense of profits.45
The team production model helps explain the broad discretion
granted directors under corporate law, as well as the limits placed
on shareholders' ability to intervene in the decision-making
process.46 But so far the team production model has not been used to
develop detailed prescriptions regarding positive duties that
directors should have. In earlier work, I have argued that the job of
boards of directors should be to maximize "the total wealth-creating
potential of the enterprises they direct."47 In doing this, directors
must understand that business enterprises generate wealth in at
least three different ways: they "provide products and services that
are worth more to the customer than the customer pays for them"
44. Shareholders must first make a "demand" on the board of directors that
it take the desired action on behalf of the firm against managers or directors
who are alleged to have violated their fiduciary duties, or they must
demonstrate that the board is so tainted by conflict of interest that demand
should be excused. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 810-15 (Del.
1984), rev'd on other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)
(discussing demand requirement). Even if demand is excused, directors may
form an investigative committee of independent directors who may take control
of the lawsuit and have it dismissed. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW
640-43 (Francis A. Allen et al. eds., 1986); see also Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779, 782-84 (Del. 1981) (discussing situations in which derivative
action can be terminated by a committee of the board).
45. See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 302-04 (reviewing the various ways
that courts "have allowed directors to sacrifice shareholders' profits to
stakeholders' interests when necessary for the best interest of 'the
corporation').
46. See Bebchuck & Ferrell, supra note 5, at 113-15 (discussing at length
the constraints on shareholders' initiatives, and a set of "reform" proposals that
would grant shareholders much more power relative to managers and directors
in publicly-traded corporations).
47. MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 239 (1995).
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(this results in "consumer surplus"); 8 they "provide opportunities for
workers to be more productive at their jobs than they could be in
other available employment" (to the extent that the workers are
paid more than they would earn at alternative employment, they
capture some of this wealth as "labor surplus"); 9 and they can
"provide a flow of profits to its investors that is greater than those
investors could get by investing in alternative activities" (such
wealth captured by financiers is "capital surplus")." Finally, the
sum of consumer surplus, labor surplus, and capital surplus must
exceed any costs imposed on the surrounding community, or on
others who are not direct participants in the enterprise.5
It seems clear that for directors to do this they must take into
account not only the investment interest of shareholders, but also
the interests of all of the stakeholders who have made specific
investments that are at risk in the enterprise. Beyond that,
however, the prescriptions that come out of a team production
approach to corporate law are not, so far, very specific, and in
practice may be indistinguishable from the prescriptions that
advocates of long-term share value maximization would make. The
difference is primarily in the language used to describe the duties.
IV. WHY CHOICE OF LANGUAGE MATTERS
The team production model of corporate law, we have seen,
suggests that the role of corporate directors is to mediate among
members of the corporate team, making decisions in the interest of
the corporate entity, which serves as a proxy for the combined
interest of all the team members. Meanwhile, leading business
people (as well as a few prominent shareholder primacy advocates),
have claimed that the "long-run" version of the shareholder primacy
model implies that corporate directors should make decisions that
accommodate the interests of important stakeholders in an effort to
maximize the long-run wealth creation by the corporation. For
example, investment banker Peter G. Peterson, who co-chaired the
Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private
Enterprise, ' observes,
48. Id. at 240.
49. Id. at 241.
50. Id. at 240-41.
51. Id. at 241. See also Gregory Scott Crespi, Redefining the Fiduciary
Duties of Corporate Directors in Accordance with the Team Production Model of
Corporate Governance, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 623, 636-39 (analyzing in detail
the complete calculations judges would have to make to determine whether
corporate officers or directors were maximizing total wealth creation).
52. THE CONFERENCE BOARD COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 3.
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[W]hereas managing for stock price gains too often means
managing for the short term, managing with an eye towards
long-term operating performance is in the best long-term
interests of the corporation and its shareholders, as well as its
other constituencies, such as employees, communities and
customers-all of whom have a decided interest in the long-
term success of the corporation.
Thus, in practice, it seems clear that it will be difficult, if not
impossible, to distinguish between the goal of overall wealth
maximization, and the goal of long-term share value maximization:
Is a decision to award stock options to all employees made because it
is good for shareholders in the long run? Or is it made to share the
benefits of wealth creation with employees, and thereby encourage
them to stay motivated and productive? Is a decision to aggressively
reduce carbon emissions from a company's plants made because it is
the socially responsible thing to do, or is it made because, in the long
run, it will be good for shareholders if the company plays a
leadership role in developing environmentally sustainable ways to
operate?
Neither a mandate to engage in long-run share value
maximization, nor a mandate to enhance the performance of the
corporation as a whole by carefully balancing competing interests so
that the team stays productive provide courts with a way to tell
whether directors are doing their job in an optimal way. Because of
this indeterminacy, courts have, wisely, avoided trying to second-
guess the decisions of directors when faced with a challenge from
shareholders (or occasionally from other constituents such as
creditors).54 Instead, unless the directors are so badly tainted by self
interest that they could not be expected to be able to make a decision
that fulfilled either mandate, courts have relied on the "business
judgment rule" which is "a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company."55  The business judgment rule
53. Id. at 9.
54. As discussed above, the rules of derivative suits normally permit only
shareholders to act for the corporation in bringing a derivative action against
directors for breach of their fiduciary duties, but corporate law occasionally
allows bondholders and other creditors to bring claims of breach of fiduciary
duty against the board once a corporation becomes insolvent. See supra notes
44-45; Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'n Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787-88 (Del. Ch. 1992)
(holding that a board of directors owes fiduciary duties to creditors no later
than when the corporation becomes insolvent).
55. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), rev'd on other grounds,
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
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protects directors from liability for honest errors and mistakes of
judgment by declaring that "[t]he law will not interfere with the
internal affairs of a corporation so long as it is managed by its
directors pursuant to a free, honest exercise of judgment
uninfluenced by personal, or by any considerations other than
welfare of the corporation.""
If judges cannot constrain director behavior to conform to either
mandate, why should it matter what metaphor or what language we
use to describe the duties of directors? The reason is that language
itself influences behavior because it is an extremely important part
of the social signals that people send each other to help establish the
norms and expectations that people have for each other.57 Although
scholars steeped in the jurisprudence of law and economics tend to
consider only the ways that economic incentives and legal
constraints influence behavior, there is strong evidence from other
social sciences that a variety of social signals also influence
behavior.58
A. Language and Cooperation
Professor Stout and I, for example, have reviewed the empirical
evidence of studies by social psychologists, sociologists, and
economists on the factors that cause people to cooperate in social
dilemma games, rather than to "defect," which, in the context of
social dilemma games means to choose the myopically self-
interested, but socially sub-optimal action.59 This evidence suggests
that cooperation rates in social dilemma games can be induced to
range, predictably, from as low as 5% to as high as 95%, depending
on the social context in which the game is played. ° The social
signals that seem to matter most include instructions from authority
figures," perceptions about whether the other players in the game
56. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944).
57. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997) (providing an interesting discussion
of how the language used by judges in the Delaware courts help to establish
norms and expectations that directors should be responsible and ethical, even
as the substance of the actual decisions gives directors enormous discretion).
58. See Blair & Stout, supra note 15.
59. Id. at 1760; see also David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in
Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7
RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 58, 77-85 (1995) (reviewing the findings from dozens of
social dilemma experiments over the years).
60. Blair & Stout, supra note 15, at 1768.
61. Id. at 1769. In the stylized world of social dilemma games, instructions
from authority figures usually mean whatever those who are running the
experiment tell or ask the players to do.
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are members of one's own group, however such groupings might be
defined,62 and the expectations that players have about how likely
their fellow players are to cooperate.63
A consistent finding in social dilemma games is that cooperation
rates can be dramatically increased (by as much as 40 percentage
points) if the experimenter simply tells the players they are
supposed to cooperate.64 Likewise, cooperation rates fall by as much
as thirty-three percentage points if players are instructed to
compete.65  By analogy, if corporate executives and directors
announce to corporate participants that the venture they are
participating in is a competitive enterprise in which employees must
get what they can for themselves because officers and directors are
working for the sole benefit of shareholders, it seems unlikely that
they will elicit as much eager cooperation and self-sacrifice for the
good of the enterprise than if they announce that all of the
participants, regardless of what kind of contribution they bring to
the enterprise, are part of the same team, and all will share in the
success of the enterprise.
The language of team production is also a language that
suggests to corporate participants that they are all part of the same
in-group. In contrast, the language of shareholder primacy suggests
that shareholders are a privileged in-group, while all others are
outsiders, and not part of the in-group. Social scientists have
shown, however, that when group identity is brought into play as a
factor in social dilemmas, individuals who perceive themselves to be
a part of the same in-group with their fellow players are far more
likely to cooperate than individuals who perceive themselves to be
playing against another group.66
Finally, social scientists have found that individuals are much
more likely to cooperate if they expect their fellow players to
cooperate. It seems unlikely on its face that employees, suppliers,
creditors, customers, and communities will be eager to cooperate to
produce a successful outcome in an enterprise if directors and
managers repeatedly assert that the enterprise is all about profits
for shareholders, period. Admittedly, there may be circumstances in
which old implicit and explicit understandings about how economic
gains from an enterprise are to be shared must be broken, and new
62. Id. Group membership can be defined in such games by factors as
otherwise meaningless as colored markers drawn randomly from a jar.
63. Id. at 1772.
64. Id. at 1769-70.
65. Id. at 1770.
66. Id. at 1171; see also Sally, supra note 59, at 68.
67. Blair & Stout, supra note 15, at 1772.
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contracts (explicit and implicit) must be written. The major
commercial airlines, for example, are all in the process of trying to
slash costs by rewriting their contracts with suppliers, creditors,
and labor.68 But it seems self-evident that those negotiations would
be much less likely to yield sacrifices by other corporate participants
if profits were still strong, and if the stated purpose of the sacrifices
was to make shareholders even better off. The language of
shareholder primacy is a language that draws attention to
conflicting interests and announces that, when faced with conflicts,
directors will choose to benefit shareholders over all others. By
contrast, the language of team production is a language of shared
sacrifices and shared benefits.
B. Language and Incentive Systems
As if the language of shareholder primacy was not divisive
enough by itself, shareholder primacy advocates also have
frequently advocated that executives and directors should be
compensated in ways that are tied to share price performance.
Behind this desire to link executive pay to share price is a firmly-
held belief by individuals trained in the logic of law and economics
that corporate executives are fundamentally untrustworthy, and
will abuse their positions of power and authority by redirecting
corporate assets to their own benefit at the expense of the
corporation unless they are given powerful economic incentives to
focus solely on those activities that enhance share price. The whole
idea of incentive compensation, then, became part of a set of social
signals sent by investors, academics, consultants, and the media in
the 1980s and 1990s that corporate managers were expected to play
a competitive game, not a cooperative one. It was expected that they
would be in the game for themselves, rather than for some larger
vision, so that directors would have to make it attractive for the
executive not to cheat the company, but rather to work for higher
share value.69
68. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, The Economics of Post-September 11
Financial Aid to Airlines, 36 IND. L. REV. 2 (2003) (describing the wrenching
effect on the airlines of reductions in air travel since September 11, 2001).
69. See, e.g., MARGIT OSTERLOH & BRUNO S. FREY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
FOR CROOKS? THE CASE FOR CORPORATE VIRTUE (Institute for Empirical
Research in Economics, Working Paper No. 164, 2002) (arguing that extrinsic
motivation through incentive contracts and intensive monitoring crowds out
intrinsic motivation, resulting in a "governance structure for crooks"); see also
Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter, Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary
Cooperation?, 1 (USC Center for Law, Economics & Organization, Research
Paper No. C01-3, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=229047
(reviewing the empirical evidence that incentive contracts "crowd out" intrinsic
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The result was an orgy of stock option grants, 7o compensation
levels that rose by orders of magnitude to heights (relative to the
wages of average workers) not seen since the Robber Baron days,71
and huge incentives to manipulate stock prices with misleading
information. "Unfortunately, institutional investors, corporate
governance activists, and even SEC regulations have led many
corporations to define performance simply as stock performance-to
disregard a corporation's vision and ... its value system," observed
consultant Pearl Meyer during a recent Harvard Business School
roundtable.7 1 "As a result of all this emphasis on stock price, 60% of
CEO compensation today is in stock options. [Including] other
elements of pay, 70% in all is stock-based. . .. ""
Although options were often sold as a form of compensation that
would align the interests of directors and officers with those of
shareholders, they actually have the effect of creating further
divisions within the organization. This is because option holders
can make themselves better off at the expense of shareholders, as
well as all other stakeholders, by causing the firm to engage in
highly risky strategies (not to mention by lying about accounting
performance in the hopes of manipulating stock prices).
Nevertheless, most shareholder primacy advocates saw only the
incentives that stock options created for increasing share prices.
"Weren't we saying in the 1980s that we should tie CEOs to the
motivation, and providing new experimental evidence that the crowding out
effect is strong enough that incentive contracts "are on average less efficient
and elicit less effort from agents, than contracts that do not provide any
incentives at all").
70. The compensation mechanism of choice to provide executives with
incentives to focus on share value has usually been stock options, although the
reasons were primarily tax and accounting factors rather than economic
incentive reasons. Corporations have not been required to treat stock option
grants as a cost, to be charged against earnings in the current period, an
accounting treatment that made it easier for directors to think of options as
"free" and to award them in very large quantities. For tax purposes, options are
attractive to the recipients because they are not treated as income to the
recipient until she exercises the options (at which point, the difference between
the price the recipient pays to exercise the option and the trading price of the
stock will be treated as a cost to the company for tax purposes, and as income to
the recipient).
71. See Paul Krugman, For Richer: How the Permissive Capitalism of the
Boom Destroyed American Equality, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 20, 2002, at 62,
64 (citing data on income distribution and arguing that we are now living in a
"New Guilded Age").
72. What's Wrong with Executive Compensation?, HARv. Bus. REV., Jan.
2003, at 69, 72.
73. Id. Meyer said that her data are based on compensation for CEOs at
the largest 200 corporations in the United States. Id.
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market in order to identify them with shareholder value?" asked Joe
Bachelder, a leading compensation lawyer and consultant
participating in the same roundtable.74 "We got what we asked for,"
he added in response to his own rhetorical query."
C. Language and Ethical Behavior
The language we use to describe the job of corporate officers and
directors also helps to create the climate within which ethical
decisions are made. As Professor Lynne Dallas has observed, 6 the
United States Sentencing Commission's Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines, supported by case law,77 suggest that one of the
important duties of directors and officers of corporations is to put in
place information and control systems that will help to prevent
unethical or illegal behavior by employees. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (the "Act") further directs the Sentencing Commission to
reevaluate its sentencing guidelines to be sure that they are
"sufficient to deter and punish organizational criminal activity."78
The Act also directs the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Commission") to require public corporations to disclose whether or
not they have adequate internal controls," and whether or not they
have a code of ethics for senior officials and, if not, to disclose the
reason why not. °  And it directs the Commission to require
companies to disclose situations in which directors waive an ethics
requirement for some employee, or for some transaction, and explain
why.8 The New York Stock Exchange has also proposed similar
rules, plus a requirement that goes even further by requiring that
listed corporations "proactively promote ethical behavior."8 2 The
Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private
Enterprise further espouses (among other recommendations) the
principle that "ethical standards and the skills required to foster
74. Id. at 73.
75. Id.
76. Dallas, supra note 16, at 7-12.
77. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968-
70 (Del. Ch. 1996) (suggesting that directors have a duty to become informed
about legal compliance matters in their organizations).
78. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 805(a)(5), 116 Stat.
745 (2002).
79. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §404.
80. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406(a).
81. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406(b).
82. Corporate Governance Rule Proposals Reflecting Recommendations from
the NYSE Corporate, Accountability and Listing Standards Committee As
Approved by the NYSE Board of Directors, available at
http://www.nyse.con/pdfs/corp-gov-pro-b.pdf, at § 10 (last modified Aug. 1,
2002).
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ethical practice throughout the organization should be among the
core qualifications for the CEO and other senior management
positions," that a board committee should be designated to oversee
ethics issues, and that "ethics-related criteria" should be included in
employees' annual performance reviews and in the evaluation and
compensation of management.83
How does a corporation "proactively promote ethical behavior,"
and how do directors evaluate management on the basis of "ethics-
related criteria"? Related questions have been studied in some
detail by business ethicists and social scientists who have inquired
into the problem of creating an ethical corporate climate.84 Dallas
summarizes a growing literature on the subject, which, consistent
with the findings on trust and trustworthy behavior in the previous
section, finds that ethical behavior is more strongly influenced by
situational factors than by the personal belief systems of
individuals.8
Dallas' summary suggests a number of ways that shareholder
primacy language, as well as incentive compensation systems tied to
stock price performance, might undermine any attempt to create or
maintain an ethical climate within an organization. For example,
she finds several different contextual factors that encourage or
discourage employees from giving priority to moral decision-making
and actions.86 One of these is the "role expectations" within the
business environment. Because most employees segregate the
values that influence their choices at home from the values that
influence their choices at work, "managerial decisions will
correspond more closely to the humanistic, religious, cultural and
societal values of society-at-large only when these values are made
part of the job environment."87 The rhetoric of shareholder primacy,
however, serves to suppress values of empathy toward others to
focus attention solely on the bottom line financial impact of
corporate decisions.
Dallas argues that the "ethical climate of a corporation consists
83. THE CONFERENCE BOARD COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 32.
84. See, e.g., Woodstock Theological Center Seminar in Business Ethics,
Creating and Maintaining an Ethical Corporate Climate, available at
http://www.georgetown.edu/centers/woodstock/businessethics/ecct.htm (last
visited July 13, 2003) [hereinafter Woodstock Theological Center]; see also
Dallas, supra note 16, at 13 n.38.
85. See, e.g., O.C. Ferrell & Larry G. Gresham, A Contingency Framework
for Understanding Ethical Decision Making in Marketing, 49 J. MKT. 87, 92-93
(1985).
86. Dallas, supra note 16, at 26.
87. Id. (quoting Michael Bommer et al., A Behavioral Model of Ethical and
Unethical Decision Making, 6 J. Bus. ETHICS 265, 268 (1987)).
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of the ethical meaning attached by employees to organizational
standards, practices and procedures, including managerial behavior
and reward systems, that reflect the corporate norms and values."88
While I would imagine that most shareholder primacy advocates
believe themselves to be highly ethical people, with a low tolerance
for unethical behavior,89 the language of shareholder primacy states
outright that the norms and values of the corporation should be
about enhancing shareholder value, and any consideration of the
impact of corporate actions on other stakeholders is only
instrumental. Moreover, the incentive systems promoted by
shareholder primacy advocates reinforces the message by
emphasizing self-interest as a motivation, and rewarding choices
that emphasize the financial bottom line over other goals. Such
practices and procedures can easily undermine verbal messages that
seem to place a value on ethics. ° Dallas concludes, for example,
that performance evaluations that increase the competitiveness of
the work environment, and "unduly focus on the bottom line can
lead to pressures to engage in unethical conduct."9' Other scholars
and commentators have made similar points. "It was the laser focus
on stock price gain that encouraged executives to drive their beasts
so hard they collapsed. CEOs were the visible villains, but there
were whips wielded to keep them driving toward maximum share
88. Id. at 32.
89. See Michael C. Jensen & Joe Fuller, What's a Director to Do?, in BEST
PRACTICE 243 (Perseus Publishing ed., 2003) (devoting an entire section of their
article on reforming corporate boards to the problem of restoring honesty and
integrity to corporate decision-making).
90. "Enron rang all the bells of CSR [Corporate Social Responsibility],"
noted Marjorie Kelly, editor of Business Ethics in the magazine's first post-
scandal editorial.
It won a spot for three years on the list of the 100 Best Companies to
Work for in America. In 2000, it received six environmental awards.
It issued a triple bottom line report. It had great policies on climate
change, human rights, and (yes indeed) anti-corruption. Its CEO gave
speeches at ethics conferences and put together a statement of values
emphasizing 'communication, respect, and integrity.' The company's
stock was in many social investing mutual funds when it went down.
Marjorie Kelly, The Next Step for CSR: Economic Democracy, 16 BUS. ETHICS,
May/June/July/August 2002, at 3-4 (1990). But at the same time that it was
giving lip service to the importance of ethics, Enron was providing outsized
financial rewards to employees who met or exceeded aggressive financial
targets, and conducting annual performance reviews of employees based solely
on how they did relative to financial targets, laying off those employees in the
lower tail of the distribution. See Wendy Zellner et al., Fall of Enron, Bus.
WEEK, Dec. 17, 2001, at 30, 33-36.
91. Dallas, supra note 16, at 48.
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price: whips of firing, stock options, and hostile takeovers," observes
Marjorie Kelley, editor of Business Ethics magazine. 92
To be fair, the rhetoric of team production can also be used to
promote unethical practices by supporting a "win at any cost"
mentality among corporate "team members." But it seems
inherently less likely to promote cutthroat competition among team
members, and also more conducive to assessing corporate actions
and choices in terms of their impact on all of the corporation's
stakeholders, and not just the impact on one subset of stakeholders.
Directors who start from the premise that their job is to oversee
the work of a team and to mediate among team members to
encourage them to work together to achieve value creating corporate
goals are more likely to consider each decision in terms of its impact
on each of the relevant and important stakeholders, as well as on
the overall goals of the corporation. In the long run, making
decisions in this way seems more likely to produce sustainable, long-
run value creation than allowing decision-making to be driven by
when management's stock options expire, or by what management
thinks market analysts want to hear at the next analysts' meeting
to justify their "buy" recommendations.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The problem with shareholder primacy rhetoric is not that
profits and share price are not important measures of overall
corporate performance. Rather, it is that when coupled with a
religious devotion to the efficient capital markets hypothesis (which
teaches that today's share price is a better forecast of performance
than any innovative, carefully articulated, holistic, and nuanced
strategic plan or forecast by management could be), shareholder
primacy becomes a mantra that can justify actions taken in the
business context that most business people would not contemplate
in other contexts. As Harvard Business School professor Thomas R.
Piper puts it,
The idea of emphasizing shareholder wealth was not a bad
message. It was shorthand for "Let's focus on becoming more
efficient in competitive terms." And it worked in
accomplishing that objective. But it fails to connect to all the
constituencies-other than the shareholders-whose energies
and commitment you need. They heard it as, "Let's make rich
people richer." And it did not address the matter of how the
92. Kelly, supra note 90.
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maximization was to be accomplished.93
Business organizations, like any goal-oriented organizations,
need shorthand language or "code" to share relevant information
among the participants in the organization, to convey to all team
members what the collective goals are, and to measure progress
toward those goals.94 But any shorthand phrase that is used to
define corporate goals can be manipulated and corrupted. Lynn
Stout and I have suggested elsewhere that corporate law and
governance problems should be understood and analyzed as "team
production" problems.9" And I have argued here that the language
of team production evokes concepts such as cooperation, mutual
support, sharing of burdens and rewards, and win-win solutions.
Such concepts are surely more likely than the concepts and images
associated with shareholder primacy to elicit behavior from
corporate participants that builds and sustains the enterprise rather
than undermines and corrupts it.
But the language of team production could also be corrosive if
used to justify free riding, blame sharing, or vaguely worded
corporate goals that do not provide a means to measure performance
and hold managers and boards accountable. Words are important,
but even more important is the context in which they are used, who
uses them, and how the individuals who use those words exercise
leadership. The single most important factor in creating a corporate
culture that promotes ethical conduct on the part of the organization
and its employees is the "quality of corporate leadership, especially
the 'tone at the top' set by boards," according to the Conference
Board report.96
If the people invoking them behave honorably, poorly chosen
metaphors and symbols are unlikely by themselves to corrode trust,
cooperation, and ethical behavior. But if the people invoking them
are behaving badly, even the most well chosen language and
symbolic acts cannot promote trust, cooperation, and ethical
behavior. Nonetheless, for corporate leaders who want to build a
climate that supports trust, cooperation, and ethical behavior, the
language of team production surely provides a better starting place
93. Thomas R. Piper, What Leaders Need to Do to Restore Investor
Confidence, available at http://hbswk.hbs.edu/pubitem.jhtml?id=3126&sid=O&
pid=0&t=leadership (last modified Oct. 7, 2002).
94. See, e.g., BIRGER WERNERFELT, ORGANIZATIONAL LANGUAGES (MIT Sloan
School of Management, Working Paper No. 4278-03, 2003) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstract-id=372640 (last visited July 14,
2003).
95. See Blair & Stout, supra note 15, at 247-50.
96. THE CONFERENCE BOARD COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 22.
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than the language of share value maximization.
HeinOnline  -- 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 910 2003
